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Clay v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 129 Nev. Adv. Op. 48 (June 11, 2013)1 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Summary 
 The Court considered a petition for a writ of mandamus challenging an order from the 
district court denying a pretrial petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  The question before the 
Court was whether a district attorney violates NRS 172.095(2) when he or she seeks an 
indictment for child abuse or neglect under NRS 200.508(1),2 based on nonaccidental physical 
injury, but fails to inform the grand jurors of the definition of “physical injury.”   
Disposition 
 First, the Court concluded that “abuse or neglect,” as defined by NRS 200.508(4)(a), is an 
element of the Nevada child abuse and neglect statute regardless of the theory under which the 
prosecution proceeds.  Second, when the abuse or neglect is based on nonaccidental physical 
injury, NRS 172.095(2) requires that the prosecutor explain “physical injury” as defined by NRS 
200.508(4)(d) to the grand jury.  Ultimately, the Court held that the prosecutor’s failure to define 
“physical injury” here likely caused the grand jury to return one indictment on less than probable 
cause. Accordingly, it granted the petition as to that count. 
Factual and Procedural History 
 Petitioner Bryan Clay (“Clay”) was indicted by a grand jury for two counts of child abuse 
and neglect in violation of NRS 200.508(1).  The first count stemmed from an incident wherein 
Clay slapped his girlfriend, E.F., on the face several times.  The other count resulted from an 
altercation wherein Clay had used physical force against E.F., including choking, to such a 
degree that E.F. reported difficulties breathing to the police after the incident. There was no other 
testimony or evidence offered at the grand jury hearing that E.F. sustained injuries during the 
two altercations. 
Following the indictment, Clay filed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging 
the indictment arguing that (1) there was not enough evidence of physical injury presented to the 
jury to sustain an indictment for two counts of child abuse and neglect, and (2) the State had 
violated NRS 172.095(2) by not instructing the jury on the definition of “physical injury” as used 
in the child abuse and neglect statute.3 
 Subscribing to the State’s argument that an actual showing of physical or mental injury is 
inessential under the child abuse and neglect statute, the district court denied Clay’s petition.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  By Katelyn Franklin. 
2  [Hereinafter child abuse and neglect statute].	  
3	   NRS 172.095(2) requires the prosecutor to “inform the grand jurors of specific elements of any public offense 
which they may consider as the basis of the indictment.”	  
The State did not argue against, and the district court did not address Clay’s NRS 172.095(2) 
argument. 
Discussion 
 Justice Douglas wrote the opinion of the three-justice panel, which included Justices 
Gibbons and Parraguire. 4  
Interpretation of NRS 200.508(1) 
The Court first determined that the presence of “abuse or neglect” is an element of the 
child abuse and neglect statute.  The Nevada child abuse and neglect statute provides that 
[a] person who willfully causes a child who is less than 18 years of age to suffer 
unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering as a result of abuse or neglect or to 
be placed in a situation where the child may suffer physical pain or mental 
suffering as the result of abuse or neglect [is guilty of a felony].6   
The Court explained that this statute proscribes two types of abuse: first, actually causing a 
minor physical pain and mental suffering and second, the act of placing a child in a situation 
where they may suffer the same. 
The State argued that actual “abuse or neglect” is not an element of the statute when the 
State is alleging that a defendant caused a child to be placed in a situation where they may suffer 
pain or mental suffering.  The Court, however, concluded that based on the statute’s plain 
language and legislative history,8 both actual suffering and the possibility of suffering as alleged 
under the statute must be “the result of abuse or neglect.” Because “abuse or neglect” is an 
element of the child abuse and neglect statute, and because the State based its allegations of 
abuse or neglect on the theory of nonaccidental physical injury, “physical injury” was an element 
of the crime here. 
Application of NRS 172.095(2) 
The Court then turned to the issue of whether the prosecutor violated NRS 172.095(2) 
when he or she did not define the meaning of “physical injury” for the grand jury.  The Court 
concluded that a prosecutor violates this statute when he or she gives incomplete or misleading 
instruction in such a manner that results in a likelihood of a grand jury returning indictment on 
less than probable cause.9 Since the definition of “physical injury,” as defined by statute10 is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4  A writ of mandamus is an appropriate remedy for violations of grand jury procedures. See Lisle v. State, 113 Nev. 
540, 551, 937 P.2d 473, 480 (1997), clarified on rehearing, 114 Nev. 221, 954 P.2d 744 (1998). 
6  NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.508(1) (2011). 
8  Court found that the State wished to criminalize the act of allowing a child to be subject to abuse or neglect.  The 
State did not, however, intend the statute to punish abuse or neglect that could not result in physical harm or mental 
suffering. 
9 The Court reasoned that in states with similar statutes to NRS 172.095(2), namely New York, the test is whether 
the integrity of the grand jury has been impaired.  People v. Calbud, Inc., 402 N.E.2d 1140, 1144 (N.Y. 1980).  In 
other words, the test is whether the prosecutor’s incomplete or misleading instructions likely led to the grand jury 
much narrower than the definition a layperson would ascribe to the phrase, NRS 172.095(2) 
required the prosecutor to define “physical injury” for the grand jury to prevent corruption of the 
indictment. 
 The State argued that it did not violate NRS 172.095(2) because the prosecutor asked the 
grand jury if it had any questions after issuing instructions.  The Court held that this was 
insufficient because the State had not read the elements of the child abuse and neglect and had 
not explained the meaning of the elements in layperson’s terms.  
  The Court then considered whether the prosecutor’s failure to explain “physical injury” 
caused the grand jury to return an indictment on less than probable cause.  The Court held that 
with respect to the first count where there was no testimony or evidence given suggesting that the 
victim had sustained physical injury from the slapping, the grand jury likely returned the 
indictment on less than probable cause.  However, the Court concluded that as to the other count, 
the grand jury likely returned an indictment on probable cause because they could infer “physical 
injury” based on the victim’s statement to the police that she was having difficulty breathing 
after the altercation.   
Conclusion 
 The Court granted the petition for extraordinary relief in part, and directed the Clerk of 
the Court to issue the writ of mandamus instructing the district court to dismiss count one of the 
indictment without prejudice.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
returning an indictment on less than probable clause.  Id.  Additionally, according to statement made at a hearing 
before the State Judicial Committee, the Nevada statute was intended to add fairness to grand jury proceedings by 
providing layperson with detailed explanations of the law and elements of crimes.  Hearing on S.B. 107 Before the 
Senate Judiciary Comm., 63d Leg. (March 4, 1985) (statement of Senate subcommittee member Sue Wagner). 
10  NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.508(4)(d) (2011).	  
